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Abstract
We show that quantum game theory oﬀers solution to the famous
Newcomb’s paradox (free will problem). Divine foreknowledge is not
necessary for successful completion of the game because quantum
theory oﬀers a way to discern human intentions in such way that
the human retain her/his free will but cannot proﬁt from changing
decision. Possible interpretation in terms of quantum market games is
proposed.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a common belief that the characteristic size of the brain’s integral
parts is too big to allow for quantum eﬀects being important [1]. But re-
cent experiments show that separated objects of the size of a golf ball can
1form quantum entangled states even in a room temperature [2]. Physicists
successfully apply quantum mechanics to describe a lot of complex system
that may have in principle arbitrary size, including black holes or even
the whole Universe. Are there any reasons for quantum modeling of phe-
nomena related to brain activity, consciousness or social behaviour? One
can give an answer to this question only after construction and thorough
veriﬁcation of respective models [3]. Below we consider a problem easily
susceptible of modeling as a quantum game that should shed some light on
the solutions that quantum theory may oﬀer.
In 1960 William Newcomb, a physicist, intrigued the philosopher Robert
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not able to chose his strategy without having any measure of occurring a




















2. It so happens even despite the fact that the feminine
strategy dominates the masculine one (that is the pay-oﬀ is greater regard-





more proﬁtable when the event corresponding to the oﬀ-diagonal elements
of
M do not occur and the rest have almost equal probabilities. This might
happen if the opponent is able to foresee the player 1 moves. Due to this
paradoxical property the above game with indeﬁnite (hidden) set of oc-
currences became for philosophers, economists and theologians a graceful
theme of speculations about free will and its consequences [4, 5]. The dis-
putes, often referred to as newcombmania [6], deserve a thorough analyzis
from the quantum game theory point of view [7]-[11]. The development of
the probability theory provide us with many intriguing examples where
ambiguous speciﬁcation of the appropriate probability measures resulted
in contradiction (Bertrand [13] and Banach-Tarski [14] paradoxes are the
most famous ones). One can still ﬁnd people who regardless of this facts
continue philosophical disputes while ignoring the necessity of precise deﬁ-
1The use of the adjectives feminine and masculine to underline the character of the
strategies will be explained later, see also the Gardner book
2nition of the probabilistic measures in their models. We would like to show
that quantum theory may be of help in settling the ambiguities.
2 Quantum description of the game
Quantum game theory exploits the formalism of quantum mechanics in or-
der to oﬀer the players new classes of strategies. Interesting generalization
of well known classical games have been put forward [7, 8]. There are argu-
ments that quantum strategies may oﬀer extraordinary tools for biologists
[15]-[17]. Economics being the theater of various games and conﬂicts should
not despise these new ideas [18, 12]. We will describe player’s strategies
as vectors (often referred to as states) in Hilbert spaces
H






2 distinguish between the player 1 and 2. It is convenient to





























































































2. For our aims it will be suﬃcient to use two
dimensional Hilbert spaces for the players’ strategies. The states of the










) describe situations (strategies) that
are out of the reach for classical players. Following the classical terminology
we will call the pay-oﬀ observable










































Therefore, according to the classical interpretation of the game, the player
1’s expected pay-oﬀ is equal to the sum of diagonal elements (trace) of the
product of

























33N e w c o m b ’ s p a r a d o x
M. Gardner proposed the following fabulous description of a game with pay-
oﬀ given by the matrix
(1
) [4]. An alien Omega (or Alf?) being a omniscent
representative of alien civilization (player 2) oﬀers a human (player 1) a
choice between two boxes. The player 1 can take the content of both boxes
or only the content of the second one. The ﬁrst one is transparent and
contains $1000. Omega declares to have put into the second box that is




2) but only if he foresaw that the




1). A male player 1
thinks: If Omega knows what I am going to do then I have the choice




1). A female player 1 thinks: Its obvious that I want to take the only
the content of the second box therefore Omega foresaw it and put the
$1000000 into the box. So the one million dollar is in the second box.




1). The question is whose strategy, male’s or female’s, is better? One
cannot give unambiguous answer to this question without precise deﬁnition
of the measures of the events relevant for the pay-oﬀ.
4 Human’s and Omega’s strategies
Omega as representative of an advanced alien civilization is certainly aware
of quantum properties of the Universe that are still obscure or mysterious
to humans. The boxes containing pay-oﬀs are probably coupled. One can
suspect this because the human cannot take content of the transparent box
only ($1000). The female player is sceptical about the possibility of realiza-
tion of the Omega’s scenario for the game. She thinks that the choice of the
male strategy results in Omega putting the one million dollar in the sec-
ond box, and after this being done no one can prevent from her taking the
content of the both boxes in question (ie $1001000). But Meyer proposed a
quantum tactics [7] that, if adopted by Omega, allows Omega to accomplish
his scenario. Let us note that Omega may not be able to foresee the future
[4]. For it aims it is suﬃcient that it is able to discern human intentions re-
gardless of their will or feelings on the matter. The obstacles to this implied
by the no-cloning theorem can be overcome by means of teleportation [19]:
Omega has must be able to intercept and then return human’s strategies.
4The presented below manipulations leading to thwarting humans are fea-
sible with contemporary technologies. The course of the game may look







describes the human’s intended strategy and the Omega’s strategy based
on its prediction of human’s intentions. The actual game must be carried on
according to quantum rules that is players are allowed to change the state
of the game by unitary action on




1. Omega’s tactics must not depend on the
actual move performed by the human player (it may not be aware of the
human strategy): its moves are performed by automatic device that couples
the boxes. The Meyer’s recipe leads to:
1. Just before the human’s move, Omega set the automatic devise ac-




I,w h e r e
I is the identity transform (Omega cannot
change its decision) and
F is the well known Hadamard transform















2. The human player with the probability













3. At the ﬁnal step the boxes are being opened and the built-in coupling





5 The course of the game and its result
Let us analyze the evolution of the density operator
W. The players’ tactics,
by deﬁnition, could have resulted in changes in the (sub-)space
H
1 only
therefore it suﬃces to analyze the human’s strategies. In a general case the
human can use a mixed strategy: the female one with the probability
v and
the male one with the probability
1
￿
v. Let us begin with the extreme values
of




or the male one (
v
=





















































































































































































































































It is obvious that independently of the used tactics, human’s strategy takes
the starting form. For the mixed strategy the course of the game is described


























































Therefore the change of mind resulting from the female strategy cannot
lead to any additional proﬁts. If the human using the female tactics (that
is changes his/her mind) begins the game with the female strategy then at
the end the untransparent box will be empty and he/she will not get the
content of the transparent box: the pay-oﬀ will be minimal (0). If the human
acts just the opposite the transparent box must not be opened but never-
theless the pay-oﬀ will be maximal ($100000). Only if the human begins
with the female strategy and then applies the male tactics the content of
the transparent box is accessible. If restricted to the classical game theory
Omega would have to prevent humans from changing their minds. In the
6quantum domain the pay-oﬀ
M
2
1 (female strategy and tactics) is possible
(the phrase la donna mobile gets a quantum context): humans regain their
free will but they have to remember that Omega has (quantum) means to
prevent humans from proﬁting from altering their decisions. In that way
quantum approach allows to remove the paradox from the rationally de-
ﬁned dilemma. One can also consider games with more alternatives for
the human player. The respective larger pay-oﬀ matrices would oﬀer even
more sophisticated versions of the Newcomb’s observation. But even then
there is a quantum protocol that guarantees that Omega keeps its promises
(threats) [21].
6 Market interpretation of the game
It is obvious that the above scenario cannot be realized if the actual con-
ditions would diﬀer from Omega’s promises. For example, Omega may not
be able to predict humans intentions or its understanding of the rules of
the game diﬀers from that implied by their expression in human language
(cultural diﬀerences). There may be much dispute over the question what
Omega really has in mind? We would like to consider one of the variant
that may be interesting in the context of quantum market games [12, 20]. This
may result from pondering over the meaning of the term Omega adopts
t h es a m es t r a t e g y .
Players in a quantum market game sometimes buy and sometimes sell. A
demand representation of the player’s strategy is a Fourier transform of his
strategy used while supplying the goods [12, 11]. In a simpliﬁed model where
player’s strategies span a ﬁnite dimensional Hilbert space we should apply
discrete Fourier transform which transforms the demand representation
of the strategy, being






































2 then the discrete Fourier transform reduces to the Hadamard
transform
F which we have already met. In our case the Hadamrd trans-
form switches maximally localized strategies with the the maximally indef-











































































1 and the other side
of the bargain (Omega) want to play in the same way and therefore uses the




























































































































Figure 1: The average human pay-oﬀ Tr
M
W
z in the market version of the
Newcomb game.




3Cases when the player may in fact play also ”against himself” often happen in mar-
ket description: demand or supply result from self-consistent strategy of all players. For
example in a stock exchange one big bid or transaction can inﬂuence the whole market






1). In this case the human is better oﬀ than in





1) does not change the respective probabilities but result in the








1 (male). The expectation values
of the human pay-oﬀ with respect to the adopted strategy are presented in
Figure 1.
Enthusiasts for newcombmania will certainly ﬁnd a lot of new quantum
solutions to the Newcomb game.
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